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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The economic conditions can be summarized as follows: 1) There are signs that the depression is ﬁnally
over. 2) Interest rates have been close to zero for years but are now ﬁnally expected to rise. 3) There are
some concerns from both policymakers and the market participants over indications of excessive inﬂation.
4) This is of particular concern to some who point to a large expansion in the monetary base in the past
several years as well as the current bank holdings of large excess reserves.
These four conditions characterize the economic outlook of the United States in the early months of 1937
on the verge of one of the most peculiar policy mistakes in US economic history. These circumstances may
sound familiar to a Japanese audience. In some respects Japanese policymakers confront the same problems
today. How should one manage monetary policy in a transition phase from zero short-term interest rates
and deﬂationary pressures back to more normal circumstances? We want to emphasize right from the
start, however, that fortunately it seems that both the Bank of Japan and the Japanese government have
not committed any mistakes of the same order as observed in 1937. Yet, it is useful to understand the
circumstances and mechanics of the US mistake as a precautionary tale for both current and future policy
makers.
This paper addresses the "mistake of 1937", which reversed the tide of the recovery from the Great
Depression in 1933-37 into a short but sharp recession from 1937-38. Between May of 1937 and June of
1938 GNP contracted by 9 percent1 and industrial production by 32 percent. The general price level took
a tumble as well. The index of wholesale prices, for example, fell by more than 11 percent, several leading
commodity prices collapsed and the stock market lost almost half of its value.
The mistake of 1937 was in essence a poor communications policy. At the time, President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt (FDR), his administration, and the Federal Reserve all oered confusing signals about
the objectives of government policy, especially as it related to their goals for inﬂation. In the ﬁrst year of
his presidency, FDR had vowed to ﬁght the drop in prices and to reﬂate them back to their pre-depression
levels (the reference point was often understood to be the price level in 1926). By every indication, the
public believed this commitment. But by 1937 the administration began expressing its alarm over excessive
inﬂation despite the fact that prices had not yet reached their 1926 target. Vague and confusing signals
about future policy created pessimistic expectations of future growth and price inﬂation that fed into
both an expected and an actual deﬂation. We leave it open to question whether this communication was
due to a deliberate change in policy or due to confusing signals (see the discussion in section 7 where we
propose two alternative interpretations), but we argue that regardless of the reason, the ultimate eect
was a shift in beliefs about future policy. Nominal rigidities helped propagate the shift in beliefs into an
output contraction and a collapse in prices.
We show that this propagation mechanism is particularly damaging at zero interest rates by constructing
a stylized stochastic general equilibrium model in which the zero bound on the short-term interest rate
is binding due to temporary real shocks that make the natural rate of interest temporarily negative. We
simulate this model and show that at zero interest rates, both inﬂation and output are extremely sensitive
to signals about future policy. By "extremely" we mean that if the public’s beliefs about the probability
of a future regime change by only a few percentage points, there are very large eects on inﬂation and
1We use quarterly estimates of real and nominal gross national product from Barger and Klein, which are archived in the
NBER Macrohistory database series q08296a q08260a respectively.
2output. This eect is independent of any change in the current short-term interest rate, which we assume
remains at zero.
In this stylized model, an example of such an eect might read as follows: suppose the public fully
believes that the government is committed to targeting four percent inﬂation. Now assume that in response
to recent coverage in the press that the public thinks that there is a ﬁve percent chance that the government
will change its goals of four percent inﬂation in favor of a zero inﬂation goal within the next two years. This
small change in beliefs in our calibrated model results in a double digit output collapse and deﬂation. The
large eects of shifting public beliefs about future policy may help explain how the vague and confusing
communications in 1937, which we document in some detail, had such a large negative impact.
The large eect of communication policy is unique to an environment in which the short-term interest
rate is zero. The reason is that in this environment the economy is susceptible to what we term contrac-
tionary spirals:2 if the public expects a more contractionary regime in the future, this expectation creates
contractionary expectations in all future states of the world in which interest rate are zero. Those states
of the world, in turn, depend on each other which creates a vicious feedback eect so that the equilibrium
may not even converge to a bounded solution (for some parameter values) in our approximated model.
The reason why contractionary spirals do not occur at positive interest rates is that the central bank
can react to contractionary beliefs by cutting interest rates. In contrast, when the zero bound is binding,
contractionary beliefs cannot be oset by interest rate cuts. This creates the possibility of a contractionary
spiral.
We ﬁnd that the eect of communication policy is highly non-linear at zero interest rates. At zero
interest rates, the marginal eect of creating deﬂationary expectations by signaling tightening (targeting
lower future inﬂation) is much larger than the marginal eect of signaling loosening of policy (targeting
higher inﬂation). Our interpretation of this ﬁnding is that if a policy maker is uncertain about the nature
of the real shocks and wishes to be conservative he should err on the side of allowing some excess inﬂation.
Because our theory relies on shifting public beliefs about future policy, a natural place to look for
evidence for the theory is within the newspapers in 1937-38. In our historical narrative (in section 5) we
document several newspaper accounts that are consistent with our hypothesis. In addition we construct a
new index based on newspaper records which summarizes the intensity of communication policy at a given
time. We ﬁnd evidence of a twofold increase in policy communication in the months we identify with the
mistake of 1937.
Our theory gives a novel account of the mechanism by which monetary policy was responsible for the
recession of 1937 and the recovery in 1938. Previous accounts of monetary policy during this period, e.g.
Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Romer (1992) and Meltzer (2003), have mostly focused on static changes in
some measure of the money supply and static changes (or rather lack there of) in the short-term nominal
interest rate which only increased temporarily in 1937 and then only by very modest amounts. The current
paper diers from most studies of monetary policy during this period because according to our model
the evolution of monetary aggregates is completely irrelevant at zero interest rates, except in their role in
inﬂuencing the expectations about future money supply at the time at which the interest rates are expected
to be positive.
Our view is that the expectation channel strengthens the argument made by the authors cited above,
2In an earlier version of the paper we termed it deﬂationary sprial but we prefer to use the word contractionary spiral
because it can refer to either deﬂation or output contraction. We thank Kunio Okina for drawing our attention to this.
3among others, that monetary factors were responsible for the contraction of 1937-38. Furthermore, our
theory is less subject to some of the traditional Keynesian objections which we discuss in some detail in
section 5. Much of the Keynesian literature maintains that increasing the money supply, and by implication
monetary policy, is irrelevant due to the zero bound on the short-term interest rate. While the current
model shares the zero bound with the Keynesian literature, monetary policy still exerts a very strong eect
on economic outcomes, because expectations about future money supply have a large eect on output and
prices.
This paper builds on recent advances in the analysis of stochastic general equilibrium models with
nominal frictions at zero interest rates. Recent paper in this vain include Krugman (1998), Jung, Teren-
ishi, Watanabe (2005), Svensson (2001,2003), Jeanne and Svensson (2006), Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003,2004), Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2004), Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005), Eggertsson (2005,
2006a,b), Adam and Billi (2006) and Nakov (2005). For a survey of some of this literature see Svensson
(2004) and for a short summary see Eggertsson (2006c). The paper shares with this work its emphasis on
the importance of expectations about future policy when interest rates are zero. It adds to this literature
by modeling shifts in expectations as being due to a Markov switching process for policy regimes. This
innovation allows us to simulate a model to replicate the Great Depression and gives a novel account of the
recession of 1937-38 as being due to shift in beliefs about future money supply rather than due to static
changes in the money supply, which this literature has shown to be irrelevant at zero interest rates.
We use narrative evidence to identify the shift in beliefs corresponding to the mistake of 1937 and
the reversal in 1938. We then compare this narrative identiﬁcation to the one estimated in our general
equilibrium model and ﬁnd that the two correspond to each other to some extent. The narrative approach
is similar in spirit to Romer and Romer’s (1989) inﬂuential study using Federal Reserve transcripts to
identify policy shifts in the post war period.3 There are some dierences, however. The model of this
paper suggests that the intentions of the policy makers, the focus of Romer and Romer’s (1994) analysis,
may not be the most natural place to look for narrative evidence for our model. Instead, it is the public’s
belief about future policy that matters in our analysis. While these two things may coincide (and will
probably do so in most cases), they do not need to. In particular a more natural place to look for narrative
evidence for our purposes is newspapers, since these reﬂect better public perceptions about policy than
conﬁdential transcripts of policy deliberations which were not known by the public at the time.
While our interpretation of the theoretical analysis is that beliefs were primarily moved by communi-
cations we do not think that words are the beginning and end of policy commitments during the Great
Depression. There were several actions taken during this period that can be interpreted as having made
the policy communication credible. Fiscal policy, gold interventions and the National Industrial Recovery
Act, for example, were surely important in 1933 to make FDR’s policy of reﬂating the price level credible.
We emphasize that these actions should be interpreted through the eect they had on expectations and
that they reinforced the communication policy. In two closely related papers, Eggertsson (2005,2006b), the
eect of these complementary policy actions is analyzed under the extreme assumption that words carry no
weight. These two papers show that a large part of the New Deal can be interpreted as actions that made
FDR’s announcements to inﬂate credible, i.e. these policy actions made the reﬂation program incentive
compatible in a Markov Perfect Equilibrium. Fiscal policy in 1937 and 1938 may also have played a role in
3See Orphaniides (2004) for an account of the discussion within the Federal Reserve during the Great Depression, based
on Federal Reserve transcipts amoung other things.
4changing beliefs since it was complementary to what the administration was saying about its future policy
(it was deﬂationary in 1937 and then inﬂationary again in 1938).
Our modelling strategy and quantitative investigation is similar in spirit to Goodfriend and King’s
(2005) analysis of Volcker disinﬂation in early 1980’s and Scaumburg and Tambalotti (2006). As in Good-
friend and King (2005) the private sector expectations depend on the beliefs about future policy regimes,
and we show how a discrepancy between the current policy regime and the beliefs about future ones can
explain large output movements.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Sections 2-4 outline a formal general equilibrium model and
investigate the eects of communications at low interest rates. Section 5 is an informal discussion and
narrative account of the mistake of 1937 based on the historical record, guided by the principles of the
model. Section 6 explores the extent to which the model can replicate the data by shifts in beliefs and
ﬁnds that it is able to do so to a remarkable extent. Furthermore, the estimated shifts in beliefs match
closely to the narrative account provided in section 5. Section 7 discusses the reasons for the mistake of
1937. The ﬁnal section concludes with some speculations on what current policymakers in Japan can learn
from the paper.
2 The Model
In this section we outline the model underlying our hypothesis of the mistake of 1937 and outline some
general implications of the analysis which could be of interest for current and future policymakers. The
model abstracts from endogenous variations in the capital stock, and assumes perfectly ﬂexible wages,
monopolistic competition in goods markets, and sticky prices that are adjusted at random intervals in the
way assumed by Calvo (1983). We assume there is a representative household that maximizes a utility
function of the form
Hw
4 X
W=w

Ww

x(FW;W)+t(
PW
SW
>W) 
Z 1
0
y(KW(m);W)gm
¸
>
where Fw is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of consumption of each of a continuum of dierentiated goods,
Fw 
Z 1
0
fw(l)

1gl
¸ 1

>
with an elasticity of substitution equal to A1. Kw(m) is the quantity of labor supplied to industry m,
where each industry employs a speciﬁc type of labor that demands wages zw(m). Sw is the Dixit-Stiglitz
price index,
Sw 
Z 1
0
sw(l)1gl
¸ 1
1
(1)
where sw(l) is the price of good l.
For each value of the disturbances w>x (·;w) is concave function that is increasing in consumption.
Similarly, for each value of w>t (·;w) is increasing up to a satiation point at some ﬁnite level of real
money balances as in Friedman (1969)4. y(·;w) is an increasing convex function. The vector of exogenous
4The idea is that real money balances enter the utility because they facilitate transactions. At some ﬁnite level of real
5disturbances w may contain several elements, so we make no assumption about any correlation of the
exogenous shifts in the functions x>t and y.
For simplicity we assume complete ﬁnancial markets and no limits on borrowing against future income.
As a consequence, the household faces an intertemporal budget constraint of the form
Hw
4 X
W=w
Tw>WSWFW  Zw + Hw
4 X
W=w
Tw>W
Z 1
0
W(l)gl +
Z 1
0
zW(m)KW(m)gm  WW
¸
looking forward from any period w.H e r e Tw>W is the stochastic discount factor by which the ﬁnancial
markets value random nominal income at date W in monetary units at date w, lw is the riskless nominal
interest rate on one-period obligations purchased in period w, Zw is the nominal value of the household’s
ﬁnancial wealth at the beginning of period w, w(l) represents the nominal proﬁts (revenues in excess of
the wage bill) in period w of the supplier of good l, zw(m) is the nominal wage earned by labor of type m in
period w,a n dWw represents the net nominal tax liabilities of each household in period w.
Optimizing household behavior then implies the following necessary conditions for a rational-expectations
equilibrium. Optimal timing of household expenditure requires that aggregate demand \w for the composite
good5 satisfy an Euler equation of the form
xf(\w>w)=Hw

xf(\w+1>w+1)(1 + lw)
Sw
Sw+1
¸
= (2)
Optimal money holding implies that
tp(pw>w)
xf(\w>w)
=
lw
1+lw
> (3)
where pw  Pw
Sw = This equation deﬁnes money demand. Utility is weakly increasing in real money balances,
but it does not increase beyond ﬁnite level of money balances ¯ p which is called the satiation point. The
left hand side of this equation is therefore weakly positive. Thus there is a zero bound on the short-term
nominal interest rate given by
lw  0 (4)
The intuition for this bound is simple. The model has no storage cost of holding money, and it can be held
as an asset. The result follows that the return on bonds must be at least as good as that on money, and
thus that lw cannot be a negative number. No one would lend 100 dollar unless she expects to receive at least
100 dollars back! Household optimization similarly requires that the paths of aggregate real expenditure
and the price index satisfy the conditions
4 X
W=w

WHwxf(\W>W)\W ? 4> (5)
lim
W$4

WHw[xf(\W>W)ZW@SW]=0 (6)
money balances, e.g. when the representative household holds enough cash to pay for all consumption purchases in that
period, holding more real money balances will not facilitate transaction any further and thereby add nothing to utility. This
is at the “satiation” point of real money balances. We assume that there is no storage cost of holding money so increasing
money holding can never reduce utility directly through x(=). A satiation level in real money balances is also implied by
several cash-in-advance models such as Lucas and Stokey (1987).
5For simplicity, we abstract from government purchases of goods.
6looking forward from any period w. Zw measures the total nominal value of government liabilities, which
are held by the household, and are the sum of Ew and Pw. Condition (5) is required for the existence of
a well-deﬁned intertemporal budget constraint, under the assumption that there are no limitations on the
household’s ability to borrow against future income, while the transversality condition (6) must hold if the
household exhausts its intertemporal budget constraint. Conditions (2) — (6) also su!ce to imply that the
representative household chooses optimal consumption and portfolio plans (including its planned holdings
of money balances) given its income expectations and the prices (including ﬁnancial asset prices) that it
faces, while making choices that are consistent with clearing ﬁnancial markets. For simplicity we assume
throughout that the government issues no debt so that 6 is always satisﬁed.
We also ﬁnd it convenient for our exposition to deﬁne the price for a one period real bond. This bond
promises its buyer to pay one unit of a consumption aggregate tomorrow, with certainty, for a price of 1+uw
in terms of the consumption aggregate at time w. This number is the short term real interest rate. While
this price is well deﬁned, no such bonds will be traded in equilibrium, because we assume a representative
household. It follows from the household maximization problem that the real interest rate satisﬁes the
arbitrage equation
xf(\w>w)=( 1+uw)Hwxf(\w+1>w+1) (7)
Each dierentiated good l is supplied by a single monopolistically competitive producer. There are
assumed to be many goods in each of an inﬁnite number of “industries”; the goods in each industry m are
produced using a type of labor that is speciﬁc to that industry and also change their prices at the same
time. Each good is produced in accordance with a common production function6
|w(l)=Dwkw(l)>
where Dw is an exogenous productivity factor common to all industries, and kw(l) is the industry-speciﬁc
labor hired by ﬁrm l. The representative household supplies all types of labor as well as consuming all
types of goods.7 It chooses its labor supply Kw(m) for each type of labor m so that it satisﬁes
zw(m)
Sw
=
yk(
|w(m)
Dw ;w)
xf(\w;w)
> (8)
where we have assumed the goods market clears and substituted out hours using the production function.
The supplier of good l ﬁrst sets its price and then hires the labor inputs necessary to meet any demand
that may be realized. Given the allocation of demand across goods by households in response to the ﬁrms’
pricing decisions, period w nominal proﬁts (sales revenues in excess of labor costs) for the supplier of good
l are given by
w(l)=sw(l)\w(sw(l)@Sw)  zw(m)\w(sw(l)@Sw)@Dw= (9)
If prices are fully ﬂexible, sw(l) is chosen each period to maximize (9). This leads to the ﬁrst order
condition for the ﬁrms’ proﬁt-maximization
6There is no loss of generality in assuming a linear production function because we allow for arbitary curvature in the
disutility of working.
7We might alternatively assume specialization across households in the type of labor supplied; in the presence of perfect
sharing of labor income risk across households, household decisions regarding consumption and labor supply would all be the
same as assumed here.
7sw(l)=

  1
zw(m)@Dw (10)
which says that the ﬁrm will charge a markup 
1 over its labor costs due to its monopolistic power. Under
ﬂexible prices all ﬁrms face the same problem so that in equilibrium |w(l)=\w and sw(l)=Sw= Combining
(8) and (10) gives an aggregate supply equation
  1

=
yk(\w@Dw;w)
Dwxf(\w;w)
(11)
We can now deﬁne equilibrium output and interest rates that takes place under ﬂexible price. We call
the real interest rate and the output in the ﬂexible price equilibrium the natural rate of interest and natural
level of output.
Deﬁnition 1 A ﬂexible price equilibrium is a collection of stochastic processes for {Sw>\ w>u w>l w>p w} that
satisfy (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (11) for a given sequence of the exogenous processes {Dw>w}= The output
produced in this equilibrium is called the natural rate of output and is denoted \ q
w and real interest rate is
called the natural rate of interest and denoted uq
w =
We assume that prices remain ﬁxed in monetary terms for a random period of time instead of being
ﬂexible. The nominal frictions make it possible for the economy to deviate from its natural level, which
makes the natural rates useful in characterizing the model’s shocks. Following Calvo (1983), we suppose
that each industry has an equal probability of reconsidering its prices each period. Let 0 ??1 be the
fraction of industries with prices that remain unchanged each period. Any industry that revises its prices
in period w, will chose the same new price s
w. Then we can write the maximization problem that each ﬁrm
f a c e sa tt h et i m ei tr e v i s e si t sp r i c ea s
Hw
(
4 X
W=w
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w@SW)@DW}
)
The price s
w is then deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order condition
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?
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}
<
@
>
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where we have used (8) to substitute out for wages. We have also substituted for the stochastic discount
factor that is given by
Tw>W = 
Wwxf(FW;W)Sw
xf(Fw;w)SW
=
The ﬁrst order condition (12) says that the ﬁrm will set its price to equate expected discounted sum of its
nominal price to a expected discounted sum of its markup times nominal labor costs.
Finally, the deﬁnition of the aggregate price index Sw by (1) implies a law of motion of the form
Sw =
£
(1  )s
1
w + S
1
w1
¤ 1
1 = (13)
With these additional conditions, we can now deﬁne a sticky price equilibrium.
8Deﬁnition 2 A sticky price equilibrium is a collection of stochastic processes {\w>S w>s 
w>T w>W>l w>u w>p w}
that satisfy (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (12), (13) for a given sequence of the exogenous shocks {w>D w}.
3 Approximate Equilibrium
We analyze the dynamics of the model by log-linearizing around a steady state in which inﬂation is zero.8
The model can be separated into two blocks. On the one hand there is a ﬂexible price part of the model.
This part of the model determines the natural rate of interest and output that we deﬁned in the last section.
These variables, output and real interest rates, will be determined completely independently of monetary
policy and are only a function of the exogenous shocks w and Dw= On the other hand there is the sticky
price block of the model. In the sticky price model output and the real interest rate depend on the policy
setting. A convenient feature of the model is that we can summarize all the shock in the sticky price model
in terms of the natural rates, so that there is a direct correspondence between the two blocks of the model.
We start by linearizing the ﬂexible price equilibrium. The natural level of output can be approximated
by
ˆ \ q
w =
1
1 + 
jw +

1 + 
tw +
1+
1 + 
dw (14)
where the hat denotes percentage deviation from steady state, i.e. ˆ \ q
w  log\ q
w @\ q>and the three shocks
are jw 
¯ xf
¯ \ ¯ xffw, tw 
¯ yk
¯ K¯ ykkw, dw =l o gDw@ ¯ D where a bar denotes that the variables (or functions) are
evaluated in steady state. We deﬁne the parameters   xf
xff\ and   ykk¯ k
yk . The natural rate of interest
can similarly be log-linearized to yield
uq
w =¯ u + 1[(jw  ˆ \ q
w )  Hw(jw+1  ˆ \ q
w+1)] (15)
where ¯ u  log
1= We now turn to the sticky price equilibrium. As mentioned above a convenient feature
of the model is that the all the shocks can be summarized in terms of the ﬂexible price equilibrium variables
ˆ \ q
w and uq
w in addition to a money demand shock.
We can express the consumption Euler equation (2) as9
ˆ \w  ˆ \ q
w = Hw ˆ \w+1  Hw ˆ \ q
w+1  (lw  Hww+1  uq
w ) (16)
where w  logSw@Sw1= This equation says that current demand depends on expectations of future output
— since spending depends on expected future income — and the real interest rate which is the dierence
between the nominal interest rate and expected future inﬂation — because lower the real interest rate makes
8This approach permits errors that are of second order or higher and our results will be inaccurate to the extent these
higher order terms are important. See Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) for discussion of the approximation method.
9The lw in this equation actually refers to log(1 + lw) in the notation of previous section, i.e. the natural logaritm of the
gross nominal interest yield on a one-period riskless investment, rather than the net one-period yield. Also note that this
variables, unlike the others appearing in the log-linear approximate relations, is not deﬁned as a deviation from steady-state
value. I do this to simplify notation, i.e. so that I can express the zero bound as the constraint that lw cannot be less than
zero. Also note that I have also deﬁned uq
w to be the log level of the gross level of the natural rate of interest rather than a
deviation from the steady state value ¯ u.
9spending today relatively cheaper than future spending. This equation can be forwarded to yield
ˆ \w  ˆ \ q
w = Hwˆ \W+1  Hw ˆ \ q
W+1  
W X
v=w
(lv  Hwv+1  uq
v)
which illustrates that the demand not only depends on the current interest rate but the entire expected path
for future interest rates and expected inﬂation. Because long-term interest rates depend on expectations
about current and future short rates the equation above can also be interpreted as saying that demand
depends on long-term interest rates.
The Euler equation (12) of the ﬁrms’ maximization problem, together with the price dynamics (13),
c a nb ea p p r o x i m a t e dt oy i e l d
w = (ˆ \w  ˆ \ q
w )+Hww+1 (17)
where  
(1)(1)

+1
1+ A 0. This equation implies that inﬂation can increase output because not all
ﬁrms will reset their prices instantaneously.
Finally the money demand equation along with the zero bound can be summarized as
pw  llw + |\w + w (18)
lw  0 (19)
lw(pw  llw  |\w  w)=0 (20)
where l ? 0 and | A 0> and w  l
1
 +
¯ xf¯ tp
¯ tpp w and the last condition is a complementary slackness
condition that says that the money demand equation must hold with equality if the zero bound is slack
(and similarly that the zero bound must be binding if the money demand equality is slack). Because the
shocks in the sticky price equilibrium are now completely summarized by the stochastic processes of uq
w
and ˆ \ q
w and w we can deﬁne an approximate sticky price equilibrium as follows.
Deﬁnition 3 An approximate sticky price equilibrium is a collection of stochastic professes for {ˆ \w>w>p w>l w}
that satisfy (16)-(20) for a given sequence for the exogenous shocks {ˆ \ q
w >u q
w > w}.
4 Policy Regimes, Structural Shocks and Communications
To model the eect of communications at zero interest rates we still need to deﬁne (i) the shock processes
that drive the dynamics of the model and (ii) the policy regimes.
Recall from last section that all the shocks of the model can be summarized by the natural rates.10
Following Eggertsson and Woodford (2004), we assume the most simple process for the exogenous shocks
that give rise to zero interest rates.
A1: The Great Depression structural shocks uq
w = uq
O ? 0 at date w =0 = It returns back to steady
state rq
K with probability  in each period. Furthermore, ˆ \ q
w =0; w= T h es t o c h a s t i cd a t et h es h o c k
10With the exception of w but we do not need to take a stance on this shock.
10returns back to steady state is denoted = To ensure a bounded solution the probability  is such that
(1  (1  ))  (1  ) A 0
For a detailed discussion of the how the structural shocks tw>j w, dw give rise to these shocks, see Eggerts-
son and Woodford (2004). The next section turns to policy. We model communication as corresponding to
signals about the likelihood of a policy regime change. In the next two subsections we propose two policy
regimes to which these signals apply.
4.1 The Deﬂationary Regime
We ﬁrst study an equilibrium under the assumption that the central bank targets a zero inﬂation target
whenever possible. We call this Policy Regime 1 or "the deﬂationary regime". Zero inﬂation implies by
(17) a zero deviation of output when there are no shocks so when assuming A1 then
w = \w =0if w   (21)
which implies by (16) that
lw = uq
w if w  = (22)
A zero inﬂation target cannot be achieved in periods w? , however, because this would imply nega-
tive nominal interest rates. We assume that in this case the central bank allows for maximum policy
accommodation and sets the interest rate at zero, i.e.
lw =0for 0 ?w? (23)
An equilibrium under Policy Regime 1 is now deﬁned as
Deﬁnition 4 Policy Regime 1 (The Deﬂationary Policy Regime). Equilibrium under Policy Regime 1 and
assuming A1 is an approximate equilibrium deﬁned in Deﬁnition 3 that satisﬁes equations (21)-(23).
Observe that we do not need to specify how the money supply is set to support this policy regime.
An equilibrium is fully determined without any reference to the money supply since it does not appear
in equations (21)-(23). For a given equilibrium, then, we can determine the money supply compatible
with this equilibrium by (18) and (20). An observation of particular interest, especially for our historical
narrative, is that any money supply above the satiation level is compatible with the policy regime in period
0 ?w? , which indicates that the value of the money supply is irrelevant when the interest rate is zero
(see Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) for a further discussion of this point).
To solve for inﬂation and output we can solve equation (17) and (16) by using (21)-(23). The value
for w and \w that solve these equation in period w?are the numbers g and ˆ \ g (where d stands for
"deﬂationary regime") that solve the two equations
g = ˆ \ g + (1  )g (24)
ˆ \ g =( 1 )ˆ \ g + (1  )g + uq
O (25)
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Figure 1: Output contraction at zero interest rates.
yielding
ˆ \ g =
1  (1  )
(1  (1  ))  (1  )
uq
O ? 0 (26)
g =
1
(1  (1  ))  (1  )
uq
O ? 0 (27)
Table 1
parameters calibrated values
 1
 0.99
 0.0091
 0.1
uq
O -0.04/4
Figure 1 shows the solution for a numerical solution of the model that is calibrated to replicate some
basic features of the Great Depression in the US. Each period is a quarter. The parameter  =0 =99 is set
to match 4% annual steady state real interest rate,  =1corresponds to log-preferences. The parameter
 is set at 0.1 so that the shock is expected to last for 10 quarters. The parameter  governs how much
inﬂation reacts to movements in output. I pick this parameter to match data from 1932 assuming that the
economcy was in the deﬂationary regime and not expected to revert to the inﬂationary one. Observe that
in 1932 the average nominal interest rate was close to zero. Furthermore there was 10 percent deﬂation.
Output had declined by about a third from its peak in 1929. Given the calibrated value of > Ic a nu s e
equation (24) to pick a  that matches this
 =( 1 (1  ))
g
\ g =0 =0091 (28)
Finally, I use (26) to pick the value of the shock uh
O t om a t c ha3 0p e r c e n to u t p u tc o l l a p s ew h i c hr e s u l t si n
uh
O = 0=04@4.
12The ﬁgure (1) shows the output contraction under this calibration for the case in which the natural rate
returns to steady state in period  =1 0 = The model indicates an output collapse of 30% and the contraction
lasts as long as the duration of the shock. The contraction at any time w is created by a combination of the
deﬂationary shock in period w?— but more importantly — the expectation that there will be deﬂation
and output contraction in future periods periods w + m?for mA0. The deﬂation in period w + m in turn
depends on expectations of deﬂation and output contraction in periods w+m +l?for lA0.T h i sc r e a t e s
vicious feedback eects that will not even converge unless the restriction on  in A1 is satisﬁed. The overall
eect is an output collapse, what we call a contractionary spiral, as shown in ﬁgure 1. The duration of the
contraction can be several years in the model, or as long as the shocks last.
The large collapse in output and prices reﬂect the strong contractionary eects brought about by
nominal frictions. One observes that the ﬂexible price output is constant throughout this period so that it
is only the interplay between the intertemporal shock uq
O and nominal frictions that bring about the output
collapse.
4.2 The Reﬂationary Regime
We now consider the consequences of a reﬂationary regime, Policy Regime 2, in which the government
targets an inﬂation rate that is higher than zero, i.e. w =  A 0= Under A1 this implies that in Policy
Regime 2
w =  for w   (29)
In addition we assume, as in Goodfriend and King (2005), that the public believes with some probability
w that in the next period the government will abandon Policy Regime 2 in favor of Policy Regime 1 for
all future periods. The probability w is therefore the probability of moving to Policy Regime 1 in period
w+1, conditional on being in Policy Regime 2 in period w. We assume that this probability can change over
time, for example, based on new information about the administration’s policy intentions. It is natural
to assume in the absence of any new information about policy, the public’s beliefs will remain unchanged.
This leads us to assume
Hww+1 = w> (30)
which says that conditional on all information in period w, the public expects to apply the same probability
to a regime change moving forward. One interpretation of the parameter w> suggested by Goodfriend
and King (2005), is that it indicates the credibility of the policy regime, because it is a measure of how
probable the public thinks it is that the reﬂationary policy regime will continue. This interpretation is also
consistent with the one suggested by Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2006) who study a regime change model
where there is a probability  of the government reneging on its previous commitment and reoptimizing.
If  were deterministic then the expected duration of the regime would be 1
 so that as  approaches zero
the regime is perfectly credible and the public believes the regime will last forever, but when it is 1 the
regime has no credibility, and the public expects it to be abandoned in the next period.
Another interesting interpretation of w concerns its variations. Since this parameter is likely to change
in the light of new information about the policy intentions of the government, changing values of w can
be interpreted as reﬂecting communications by the government about its policy objectives.
Under A1 the solution for output, denoted \ 
w > at time w   solves equation (17), i.e.
13 = \ 
w +( 1 w) (31)
so that in the reﬂationary regime
\ 
w = {1  (1  w)}1 (32)
and
lw = uq
w +( 1 w)  1w\ 
w at w  
If uq
w  , however, the central bank cannot achieve the inﬂation target in period w?because
this may imply negative nominal interest rates. We assume that in this case the central bank allows for
maximum accommodation and sets the interest rate at zero, i.e.
lw =0for 0 ?w? (33)
An equilibrium under the reﬂationary regime, i.e. Policy Regime 2, can now be deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 5 Policy Regime 2 (Reﬂationary Policy Regime). Equilibrium under Policy Regime 2, assum-
ing A1, is an approximate equilibrium deﬁned in Deﬁnition 3 that satisﬁes equations (29)-(33).
Again, as we observed when deﬁning Policy Regime 1, we do not need to specify the determination of
the money supply, because it is irrelevant as long as it is above the satiation level in periods 0 ?w?=
To solve for equilibrium output and inﬂation in period w?we can use equation (17) and (16) with
(29)-(33), along with the solutions (26) and (27). The value for w and \w that solve these equation in
period w?are the numbers u
w and \ u
w where u stands for "reﬂationary regime" that solve the two
equations.
u
w = \ u
w + Hu
ww+1 (34)
\ u
w = Hu
w\w+1 + Hu
w w+1 + uq
O (35)
The expectations are formed conditional on information at time w which takes into account that the current
regime is reﬂationary. We can express these expectations as
Hu
ww+1 =( 1 )(1  w)u
w +( 1 )wg + (1  w) (36)
were the ﬁrst term denotes the contingency in which the shock uq
w remains negative and the policy regime
is unchanged in period w +1 . Here we assume that the solution is linear in the state variable w and uq
w
which implies by (30) that the expectation of u
w+1 conditional on the regime being reﬂationary is the same
as u
w= The second term is the contingency in which the shock remains negative but the regime changes to
the deﬂationary one (Policy Regime 1). The last term is the contingency in which the shock reverts to
normal but the regime stays intact, in which case the government targets inﬂation of = We can ignore
the fourth contingency that corresponds to the one in which the shock reverts to normal and the regime
changes because in this case the government targets zero inﬂation (and the term thus drops out). We can
14similarly write the expectation for output as
Hu
w\w+1 =( 1 )(1  w)\ u
w +( 1 )w\ g + (1  w)\ 
w (37)
A solution of the model is a sequence of numbers for \ u
w and u
w that satisfy these four equations.
Substituting (36) and (37) into (34) and (35) then u
w and \ u
w solve
u
w = \ u
w + (1  )(1  w)u
w +( 1 )wg + (1  w) (38)
\ u
w =( 1  )(1  w)\ u
w +( 1 )w\ g + (1  w)\ 
w
+(1  )(1  w)u
w + (1  )wg + (1  w) + uq
O (39)
which yields
\ u
w = D(w)g + E(w) (40)
+F(w)\ g + G(w)\ 
w + I(w)uO
where the value of each of the functions A,B,C,D,F are given in the footnote.11 All of these function only
depend on time through w and are positive numbers. Given this solution one can write inﬂation as


w =

w
\ u
w +
(1  )w
w
g +
(1  w)
w
 (41)
where 1 A w =1 (1  )(1  w) A 0 and the the numbers g and \ 
w are given by (27) and (32).
As one would expect these equations are increasing in the inﬂation target  and decreasing in the
shock uq
O= The reason is that a higher inﬂation target increases expectation of future inﬂation and future
output which in turn stimulates demand in each period w?=Thus a commitment to a future reﬂationary
policy mitigates the eects of the zero bound, as argued by Krugman (1998). In the forward looking model
used here these eects are very large, owing to the opposite eects of the vicious feedback eects described
in the last section.
Of even more interest to us is how the solution depends on the probability w= Figure 2 shows the
solution in 40 and 41 under the assumption that the shock reverts at time  =1 0and that under the
assumption that Policy Regime 2 is in eect throughout. It shows the solution under four possible values
of w.W h e n w =0the inﬂation target is perfectly credible and when w =1it has no credibility so
11D(w)=
(13)w+
(1)2w(1w)
1(1)(1w)
13(13)(13w)3
(1)(1w)
1(1)(1w)
E(w)=
(13w)+
(1)(1w)2
1(1)(1w)
13(13)(13w)3
(1)(1w)
1(1)(1w)
F(w)=
(13)w
13(13)(13w)3
(1)(1w)
1(1)(1w)
G(w)=
(13w)
13(13)(13w)3
(1)(1w)
1(1)(1w)
I(w)= 
13(13)(13w)3
(1)(1w)
1(1)(1w)
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Figure 2: Output and inﬂation are extreemely sensistive to small variations in the signal w=
that the solution is identical to the one in ﬁgure 2. The intermediate cases are the ones of interest. When
w =0 =033 there is 3.3 percent probability that the regime will be abandoned in the next period. This small
probability has a very large eect on output and prices, output is 15 percent lower than if the inﬂation
targeting regime is perfectly credible and there is about 5 percent deﬂation. Even when there is only 0.63
percent chance of a regime change the ﬁgure shows that the output collapse is substantial, even if in this
case there is no deﬂation.
Table 2 transforms these probabilities into another probability measure, namely the probability that
the policy regime will be abandoned within two years, denoted w. Given our assumption that Hww+1 = w,
the probability w can be computed as
w =1 (1  w)8 (42)
We examine w in this way because this variable has an appealing interpretation. The small number 0.0063,
for example, indicates that there is 4.3 percent chance that the regime will be abandoned within 2 years.
Table 2 shows the eect of various values of w in terms of w on output for the values given in ﬁgure 2.
Table 2
w w ˆ \w when lw =0
0 0 0.5
0=0063 0.043 -5.3
0=033 0.209 -15.2
1 1 -30
These ﬁgures also demonstrate that while changes in expectations about the future monetary regimes
are extremely important at zero interest rates, they have a much smaller eect when interest rates are
positive (i.e. beyond at time wA). The reason for this is that when there are no deﬂationary shocks the
central bank can react to changes in beliefs about future policy by lowering the interest rate but this is not
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Figure 3: The response of output and inﬂation to changes in w is non-linear and extremely sensitive at
regions of high credibility.
possible when the there are deﬂationary shocks and the central bank is constrained by the zero bound.
Figure 3 plots inﬂation and output as a function of w= The ﬁgure shows the extreme sensitivity of
output and inﬂation to small variations in w= This sensitivity is particularly strong at a "high level" of
credibility, i.e. when the public strongly believes in the reﬂationary policies.
The nonlinearity of the inﬂation and output in w may have some important policy implications. It
suggests — although this remains a bit speculative — that a preemptive tightening (or communication of
such a policy shift) has a large contractionary eect, while erring on the side of reﬂationary policy has a
much smaller eect. This may indicate that a prudent approach to policy at a zero interest rate favors
erring on the side of inﬂation and accepting a rather slow response to inﬂationary pressure.
To put some more structure on this argument consider the consequences of sending a signal of "too
high inﬂation" in the sense of a signal of an inﬂation target above what is required to accommodate the
-4% negative natural rate of interest. Consider the eect of the same regime change as considered before
but now let Regime 1 now be characterized by a 8% inﬂation target instead of a 0 percent inﬂation target.
In this case an increase in w is a signal of high inﬂation instead of too low inﬂation. If expectations of this
inﬂationary regime are created then, conditional being in Policy Regime 2, w =4 %and output is given
by the AS equation by
\w = {1  (1  w)}1  4%  w1  8% (43)
Figure 4 shows that local to the fully credible inﬂation target of 4% output is extremely sensitive to
communication of a deﬂationary regime, while it responds by much less if the communication is about
excessively loose policy in the future.
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Figure 4: The nonlinearity of the zero bound indicates that output is much more sensitive to communcation
that indicates excessive tightening than to communication that implies too loose an inﬂation policy.
5 Historical Narrative: The Great Depression in the US and the
Mistake of 1937
This section illustrates the data and narrative accounts of the Great Depression era, and with the help of
the theory outlined in the previous section, it uses them to interpret the episodes of the Great Depression
and the recession of 1937-38. We also discuss how our theory of this recession diers from alternative
theories of this period. The next section estimates what pattern of beliefs could have generated the data,
assuming our model is correct.
The paper’s main hypothesis rests on the interpretation of the US recovery from the Great Depression
1933-37 outlined in Eggertsson (2005). That paper credits the strong recovery to a shift in expectations
about future policy. After a 30 percent output collapse from 1929-33, output later expanded by 39 percent
in 1933-37. The 25 percent deﬂation from 1929-1933 was replaced by 11 percent inﬂation between 1933-37.
The shifts in the wholesale price index (WPI), the consumer price index (CPI) and industrial production
(IP) are shown in ﬁgures 5 and 6 where a vertical line marks the inauguration of FDR. Eggertsson (2005)
argues that FDR’s commitment to inﬂate the price level triggered the recovery. This commitment was made
credible by several government actions, such as a vigorous ﬁscal expansion, an end to the gold standard,
and large purchases of gold abroad (today’s equivalent of foreign exchange interventions). FDR made his
objective to inﬂate clear on several occasions in the early spring of 1933. On May 1st, for example, he
stated in the Wall Street Journal:
[...] our primary need is to insure an increase in the general level of commodity prices. To
this end simultaneous actions must be taken both in the economic and the monetary ﬁelds.
FDR reiterated this in a radio address to the nation in one of his "ﬁreside chats" on May 7th.12 By late
12See FDR (1933) "Radio Address of the President May 7".
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Figure 5: WPI and CPI indicate a recovery in the price level after Roosevelt’s innauguration until the
mistake of 1937.
spring there could be no doubt in the minds of market participants that the administration was aiming to
inﬂate. The eect of this policy shift is visible in both output and prices in ﬁgures 1 and 2.
The sharp recession in 1937-38 can be interpreted through the lens of the same theory. In 1937,
however, it was the administration’s abandonment of a policy of reﬂation that was the driving force. In
1936 there were already discussions within the administration that suggested the depression was virtually
over. President Roosevelt, for example, conﬁdently claimed in his annual address to Congress on January
6th 1937. "Your task and mine is not ending with the end of the depression." There was still the thorny issue
of high unemployment, which had still not returned to its pre-depression level, but the administration’s
general view was that since industrial production was reaching its potential, unemployment would soon be
history.13
This sense of victory over the depression found its way into the administration’s communications about
inﬂation policy, which the market interpreted as a shift away from the reﬂationary commitment from the
early months of 1933. One of the earliest signs of the looming policy shift occurred within the Federal Advi-
sory Council, which on November 21, 1935 adopted a resolution recommending that the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve and the Open Market Committee take action to cut "excess reserves" by either sell-
ing some portion of their government securities holdings or by raising member bank reserve requirements.
The Board ignored these recommendations until midsummer of 1936 when the Board scheduled a raise in
reserve requirements, to become eective on August 15th in 1936.
This action appears to have had a rather limited eect on markets because it was not associated with
an explicit objective to reduce inﬂation. Indeed the Federal Reserve generally presented the increase in the
reserve requirements as having no immediate eect and because the excess reserves were "superﬂuous" (see
e.g. discussion in Orphanides (2004)). The Federal Reserve agreed in January 1937 to a second round of
increases to be scheduled for March and May of that year, and again the reaction of the market was muted.
13See Davis (1993) p.9.
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Figure 6: The reﬂation program in 1933 resulted in a rapid recovery in industrial production. Deﬂationary
expectations in 1937 led to a large output contraction but the recovery resumed again in 1938 with the
adminstration’s renewed commitment to reﬂate.
In the ensuing months, however, things began to change. Newspaper accounts of that period indicate
that in February, March, and April there was increasing alarm within the administration of the threat of
excessive inﬂation. Some pointed to the large increases in the monetary base over the period 1933-37 as
evidence of this danger. This fear also started inﬂuencing how government o!cials communicated policy,
in particular they no longer presented the increase in the reserve requirement as being purely mechanical
or "superﬂuous". On February 17th, Marriner Eccles, the Chairman of the Fed, said in the Wall Street
Journal, that "the short-term rates are excessively low and there may be a tendency for rates near the
vanishing point to increase." Furthermore he suggested that the reserve requirements were also likely to
cause an increase in long-term interest rates. The Wall Street Journal commented on this statement on
the 18th of February 1937. "This is the ﬁrst time a member of the board has publicly described the reserve
requirement as a device for preventing a further drop in long term rates." About one month later Fed
Chairman Marriner Eccles called upon the Treasury to ﬁght against "excessive" inﬂation by balancing the
budget.14
This and other newspaper accounts indicate that in the early months of 1937, the public witnessed
a change in the communication strategy of the Federal Reserve and by other government o!cials. Their
appetite for inﬂation was decreasing and they expected increases in short-term interest rate to be on the
horizon. The model in this paper can explain how these communication could have such dramatic eect
in a relatively short period. The next section makes this assessment concise by estimating the change in
beliefs required to generate the recession.
14Chicago Daily Tribune, March 16th, pg. 1.
20Table 3: The Mistake of 1937: Anti-inflationary Communcation
1. July 14, 1936 The Federal Reserve announces the first reserve requirement increase
 which will become effective on the 15th of August.
2. January 30, 1937 The Federal Reserve announces the second and third reserve requirement increases
which will become effective the 1st of March and 1st of May.
3. February 18, 1937 Marriner Eccles, Chairman of the Board of Governors, in Senate hearings:
    "The short term rates are excessively low and there may be a tendency for rates 
    near the vanishing point to increase."
    --- Wall Street Journal, February 19, 1937, pg. 1.
4. March 15, 1937 Marriner Eccles, Chairman of the Board of Governors, gives a statement:
    "The upward spiral of wages and prices into inflationary levels can be as disastrous as 
    the downwards spiral of deflation."
    --- Chicago Daily Tribune, March 16, pg. 1.
5. March 17, 1937 Commerce Secretary Daniel C. Roper and Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace 
hold press conferences: Both Secretaries warn against excessive inflation.
--- Wall Street Journal, March 18, 1937, pg. 8.
6. March 24, 1937 Marriner Eccles, Charimain of the Board of Governors, on inflation:
    "Chairmain Eccles outlines five steps to avert 'dangerous inflation' in Forbes Magazine 
    which are (i) reserve requirement increases "to eliminate excess reserves", 
    (ii) fiscal policy that balances the budget, (iii) reduction in the gold price of the dollar, 
    (iv) increase in the labor share of national income, and (v) antitrust legislation."
    --- The Christian Science Monitor, March 25, 1937.
7. April 2, 1937 Franklin Delano Roosevelt holds a press conference:
    "I am concerned -- we are all concerned -- over the price rise in certain materials."
8. August 3, 1937 Franklin Delano Roosevelt's views on price level targeting revealed: Senator Elmer Thomas
published a letter from Franklin Delano Rosevelt to him rejecting his proposal that the 
Federal Reserve should formally target the 1926 price level.
--- Wall Street Journal, August 4, 1937, pg. 6.
Table 3 list several other announcements by key administration o!cials dating back to the recommen-
dation of the Advisory Board in November 1935. The table shows several signals about the commitment
to lower inﬂation in the early months of 1937, but that was the period during which most of the key policy
announcements were made. These announcements and their eect on the public beliefs form the core of
the paper. We argue that these communications are the mistake of 1937. The mistake is exempliﬁed in
FDR’s press conference comments on April 2, 1937: "I am concerned — we are all concerned — over the
price rise in certain materials." On the day of this announcement the stockmarket fell by 6 percent. The
next day the Wall Street Journal reported as follows:
There was a feeling among some bankers that the President’s remarks bore a relation to the
recent statement of M. Eccles, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, advocating prompt balancing of the budget as the only means of averting monetary in-
ﬂation and the other recent statements of government o!cials warning of the threat of inﬂation.
All of these remarks, it was said, indicated a change in the trend of the government’s recovery
measures away from the emphasis which has been placed upon stimulation of industrial activity
and the recovery of prices.
These announcements were in opposition to FDR’s previous commitment to restore prices to their pre-
depression levels. At the time of the mistake, prices as measured by both WPI and CPI were still well
below their previous levels. WPI was 13 percent below its 1926 average and CPI was 20 percent. With
prices below their targets, the administration’s very public alarm over increasing prices sent confusing
signals to the public. The announcements suggested that the administration might abandon its previous
goals, and these fears are reﬂected in the subsequent movements of the price level.
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Figure 7: Commodity prices decline after confusing signals over the administration’s reinﬂation policy.
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Figure 8: Stock prices reﬂect the market’s reaction to contractionary and then expansionary announce-
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Figure 9: Interest rates as measured by the yield on three month treasuries remain close to zero througout
t h ee n t i r ep e r i o d .
Figure 7 shows the response of leading commodity prices in a one year window surrounding several of
the statements listed in table 1. The period of the key announcements, i.e. the one made from February to
May, is marked by a shaded region. This is the period we identify with the mistake of 1937. The monthly
price indices are reindexed to 100 in February 1937 to their relative paths15. Since commodity prices are
determined on spot markets, one would expect their prices to respond more strongly than other goods to
news about changes in future policy. All of these commodity prices show a strong change in their upward
trend in the early part of 1937 towards deﬂation. The price of corn, for example, lost more than half its
value in the six month period following FDR’s April announcement. Figure 8 shows that the stock market
also started a strong downward trend—losing almost half its value in only six months. There are no direct
data on inﬂation expectations during this period. However, alternative estimates of inﬂation expectations,
conﬁrm what can be grasped from these ﬁgures. Using very dierent estimation methodologies, Hamilton
(1992) (who uses data on commodity price future data) and Cecchetti (1992) (who uses interest rate and
CPI data) both ﬁnd evidence of an expectations shift in 1937 from inﬂationary to deﬂationary.
The near-zero interest rates throughout the period have sometimes led authors to conclude that mon-
etary policy was not contractionary (see e.g. Telser (2001)) and that monetary conditions were in fact
"easy." We ﬁnd instead that more than short-term interest rates, changing expectations about future in-
terest rates, and how in these months they depended on inﬂation and output, are important to explain the
economic collapse. Figure 9 shows the evolution of the short-term interest rate in 1930-1941 as measured
by estimated yields in 3-month Treasuries. From late 1932 onwards the short-term interest rate remained
close to zero. In the spring of 1937 it rose only slightly and then fell again. These persistently low rates
stand at odds with the collapse in output and inﬂation in 1937. In the model we have presented in this
paper, however, an increase in the current short-term interest rate is not required for contractionary mon-
etary policy. All that is needed is an expectation of future policy change. Indeed, our model assumes that
there is no change in the short-term interest rate during this period. Even with this assumption the model
15These data are monthly price indices of various commodities archived in the NBER Macrohistory database.
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Figure 10: Longer term rates all show an increase in the expected short rate through the period of policy
announcements
delivers a large contractionary outcome only due to a change in expectations about future policy, as our
estimation in the next section reveals.
Figure 10 shows how longer term interest rates responded during the periods of policy communications
that we identify. Longer term interest rates should increase in the presence of expected increases in the
short rate, and the ﬁgure conﬁrms this behavior. During the mistake of 1937, the longer term interest rates
rose beyond what is implied by the rise in the short-term rates. Even as short rates fell, long term rates
continued to increase. This is consistent with the market’s anticipation of future hikes in nominal interest
rates. It is important to recognize that the behavior of long-rates is in general not trivial, and that their
predicted path depends on how one speciﬁes the policy regime. The observed behavior of the long-rates is
most consistent with a policy regime of price level targeting, in which — if credible — the public expects the
interest rate to remain at zero until the price level reached its target. A regime of this kind unambiguously
predicts that if prices are below the target and the public expects the government to abandon its regime,
then expected future short-term interest rates will increase.16
A leading hypothesis of the contraction of 1937-38 is suggested by Friedman and Schwartz (1963).
These authors argue that the increase in the reserve requirements in August 1936 and March and May
1937 were responsible for the contraction. This hypothesis has been criticized on several grounds. The
most plausible criticism of their theory is obtained by empirically evaluating their suggested transmission
mechanism during this period, which L.G. Telser analyzes in his (2001) article "Higher member bank
reserve ratios in 1936 and 1937 did not cause the relapse into depression." The Friedman and Schwartz
hypothesis, according to Telser, implies that member bank lending should have declined in response to
the higher reserve requirements. In fact, Telser shows that private lending actually increased during this
period. Member banks simply satisﬁed the increased reserve requirements by selling their government
securities, leaving little pressure to reduce private lending. He argues that this evidence disproves the
hypothesis that monetary factors were responsible for the recession. Telser’s ﬁnding come as little surprise
16For computational simplicity we assumed the past sections that the government targeted a constant inﬂation target rather
than a price level target.
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Figure 11: Commodity prices stabilize after the administration announces a renewed comittment to price
inﬂation.
since interest rate were close to zero during this period. Bonds and money (reserves at the Fed) were close
to perfect substitutes under these conditions, and our theory suggests that the composition of government
debt between money and bonds was irrelevant under this condition as we discussed when deﬁning Policy
Regimes 1 and 2 in our model (see Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) for further discussion of the irrelevance
of money supply at zero interest rates). Similar reasons were cited by Marriner Eccles (1951), the Chairman
of the Federal Reserve, in his autobiography. Citing the "easy" monetary condition of close to zero interest
rates he blames ﬁscal policy for the recession, because the Treasury tried to balance the budget in the early
months of 1937 (partly urged on by Eccles in February, as mentioned above, something Eccles does not
mention in his scathing criticism of the Treasury!).
Our hypothesis is not subject to Telser’s (2001) criticism because our channel does not require any
change in either the monetary base or bank lending to explain the depression in 1937 as our deﬁnition of
the reﬂationary policy regime revealed. What was important was the expectation of future interest rate
and money conditions. There were, of course, other factors outside of our model that are compatible with
our explanation. Fiscal policy certainly played an important role, especially the eorts of the Treasury
to balance the budget. In this sense our theory is consistent with some aspects of both the monetarists’
and the Keynesians’ accounts of this recession. As argued by Eggertsson (2005), the deﬁcit spending
throughout 1933-37 gave the government a strong incentive to inﬂate. The later attempt of the Treasury
to balance the budget in 1937, and the public’s belief that these attempts would be sustained, worked in
the opposite direction from the deﬁcit spending in 1933-37, because they reduced the inﬂation incentive of
the government and thus reinforced an expectation of deﬂation in 1937.
25Table 4. The Reversal of 1938: Pro-inflation Communcation
1. February 15, 1938 President Roosevelt holds a press conference:
    "At his press conference today, the President said that he believes now, as he did in 1933, 
    that achivement of permanent prosperity depends on raising general price levels to those 
    prevailing in 1926."
    --- Chicago Daily Tribune, February 16, 1938, pg. 1, "Hope Inflation Will Halt Depression."
2. February 18, 1938 President Roosevelt releases a written statement at a press conference that was prepared by
Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury; Henry A. Wallace, Secretary of  
Agriculture; Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor; Marriner Eccles, Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and economists of various executive departments:
    It is clear that in the present situation a moderate rise in the general price level is 
   desirable [....] Our program seeks a balanced system of prices such as will promote a 
    balanced expansion in production. Our goal is a constantly increasing national income 
   through increasing production and employment. This is the way to increase the real 
    income of consumers.
3. April 14, 1938 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, gives addresses Congress announcing that the reserve 
requirement increases will be abandoned:
    "The measures for expanding excess reserves which were announced on Thursday by 
    President Roosevel will re-create the bases for a great credit inflation [...] Monetary 
    management, after having been directed for some time towards guarding against a 
    possible inflationary boom, has turned, under the pressure of the business depression, 
    toward the other extreme."
    --- The New York Times, April 17, 1937.
The end of the 1937-38 depression is also consistent with our hypothesis. In early 1938 the adminis-
tration restored an inﬂationary policy. Table 4 summarizes some key reﬂationary announcements. The
ﬁrst announcement of considerable importance was made at a February 15th press conference where FDR
said that he once again believed, as he had announced in 1933, that prices should be inﬂated back to
their pre-depression levels. Three days later FDR called another press conference. On that occasion he
read a statement which he had instructed Federal Reserve Chairman Eccles, Treasury Secretary Henry
Morgenthau, and several other senior government o!cials to prepare. Flanked by senior administration
o!cials FDR announced, "it is clear that in the present situation a moderate rise in the general price level
is desirable." Later that spring the administration took several steps to support an inﬂationary program,
such as lowering the reserve requirement back to its 1936 level, increasing deﬁcit spending and desterilizing
government gold stocks. Figure 11 shows the rebound in commodity prices after the "reversal of 1938." The
period we identify with the reversal of 1938 is February-May that year. The recovery is also evident from
the aggregate variables in ﬁgures 5 and 6. The 1938-1942 recovery was even stronger than in 1933-1937
and by most measures the economy had fully recovered by 1942.
It is often argued that it was wartime spending that ﬁnally lifted the US economy out of the Great
Depression. This "conventional wisdom" is probably colored by the Keynesian view that monetary policy
was impotent during this period. There is no doubt that wartime spending helped stimulate demand.
According to our hypothesis, however, the turnaround from 1937-38 is more appropriately traced back to
Roosevelt’s recommitment to inﬂation in the early months of 1938.
These cited announcements are consistent with the more general trends of policy communications in the
press during the period. We compute a crude index to estimate the intensity of inﬂation policy discussion
throughout the period. Figure 12 plots the number of newspaper articles that match criteria designed
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Figure 12: Communication intensiﬁes around the periods of the mistake of 1937 and its subsequent reversal.
to roughly identify inﬂation policy discussions. We search the Proquest Historical Newspaper database
for front page or inner articles that mention caution of inﬂation, reﬂation, deﬂation, or price level and
include the names of at least one key government o!cial17. Beginning in January 1937, communication
and press coverage over speculation about reserve requirement increases begins to intensify. During the
periods we label as "the mistake of 1937" and "the reversal of 1938" the number of matching articles more
than doubles. Examination of results within each month reveals that the preponderance of articles during
the mistake period discuss the administration’s planned response to inﬂationary threats, whereas during
the reversal they focus on the government’s renewed commitment to some price reﬂation. Although this
measure is very rough, it does conﬁrm that these two periods are unique in their increased levels of policy
discussion.
6 The data on the Great Depression through the prism of the
model
The model of this paper is quite special in several respects, and imposes stark assumptions for tractability.
Keeping those limitations in mind, it is still of some interest to re-express some of the data from the Great
Depression discussed in the last section through the prism of the model. We should state from the start
that we do not view this numerical exercise as a substitute for a full scale estimation of the model. Yet, we
believe giving some closer connection to the data may be useful in developing the theory further. Figure 13
shows monthly data on industrial production from the Great Depression as a deviation from a linear trend
estimated on the period 1921—2005. Figure 14 shows the evolution of the wholesale price index, expressed
as year on year inﬂation. We use industrial production as a proxy for output in the model and the year
on year change in WPI as proxy for inﬂation. By studying the data at monthly frequencies we can explore
the consequences of variations in the parameter w at monthly frequencies.
17We search the citation and document text ﬁelds for a match on the following criteria: (inﬂation or "price level*" or
reﬂation or deﬂation) and (fdr or roosevelt or morgenthau or eccles or roper or wallace or hopkins) and (gain* or boom or
peril* or warning or fear* or danger* or conference) for each calendar month from 1937 to 1938. We only report those with
a document type of article or front page. Varying the search terms does not change the overall trends.
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Figure 13: The model is able to match most of the changes in the output gap.
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Figure 14: The model requires a larger amount of deﬂation than actually occured to match the collapse in
output, especially in the earlier part of the recovery.
28To what extent can variations in w explain the evolution of output and prices? To answer this questions
we recalibrate the parameters of the model to monthly frequencies. The parameter  is unchanged. The
parameter  is now 0=99ˆ(1@3) and the parameter  i sc h o o s e ni nt h es a m ew a ya si ne q u a t i o n( 2 8 ) .W e
maintain the assumption from the last section that uq
O = 0=04@12. Finally we choose  =0 =0284 to
match the output decline in the beginning of the recovery in 1933. The number indicates that at that time
people expected the exogenous shocks to last for 1@ months or about three years. In our simulation we
condition on current policy set according to Regime 2 and the shock is assumed to be in the deﬂationary
state (uq
w = uq
O).
To extract the values of w that "best explain the data" we choose a path for this variable to minimize
squared deviations of the model output from the data, i.e. minimize the criterion
plqw
X
(Prgho
w  Gdwd
w )2 + #(\ Prgho
w  \ Gdwd
w )2= (44)
where # is given the arbitrary value 1/6. Figure 13 compares the values for output from the model, given
our estimated sequence of w, against the data. Figure 14 repeats this exercise for model-predicted and
actual inﬂation. Figure 15 shows the estimated sequence of w> re-expressed as w> using formula (42) (but
raising to the power of 24 to reﬂect the shift from quarterly to monthly frequency). Under this calibration
the model generates a large depression in output of roughly the same order as seen in the data. The model,
however, overpredicts the extent of the deﬂation needed to generate this output collapse. This feature is
most prominent at the onset of the recovery in 1933. This may reﬂect the presence of other non-modelled
factors that were important in explaining the contraction. The model does a better job capturing the size
of the deﬂation and output contraction in the depression of 1937-38 than in 1933, which suggests that
this recession is better explained by the propagation mechanism outlined here, recalling that there was no
banking or ﬁnancial crisis in 1937-38.
It is worth considering how the model ﬁt can be improved, especially in the period 1933-1936, since
then the inﬂation predicted by the model deviates substantially from the data. We conjecture that the
main feature that could improve the ﬁt of the model would be incorporating the evolution of marginal costs
in more detail. In the current model only prices are sticky, but wages are perfectly ﬂexible. To the extent
that movements in marginal costs due to sticky wages were limited, our conjecture is that the gap between
the model’s predicted inﬂation and the data can be reduced. More importantly, there were several policy
initiatives at the early stages of the New Deal that directly impacted marginal cost and markups in a way
that is not modelled. The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), as described in Eggertsson (2006b),
is especially relevant. It may have had considerable eects on wage costs and on the monopoly pricing of
industries. These factors are likely to have increased inﬂation well beyond what is predicted by the model,
which assumes that variation in w is the only factor aecting inﬂation. It is interesting to observe that the
Supreme Court struck down large parts of the NIRA in 1935 that it deemed unconstitutional.18 Together,
these may help explain why the gap between the model predicted inﬂation and the data is larger 1933-36
than in 1937-41.
While there is a dierence in the level of inﬂation between the model and the data - especially between
1933-1936 — the model does generate the correct change in inﬂation over this period. In particular, the
model predicts a sharp increase in inﬂation following the regime change in 1933 and also during the mistake
18See e.g. Davis (1986).
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Figure 15: The shaded periods of policy announcements predict changes in the credibility parameter.
of 1937 as well as during the reversal in 1938. The driving force of the simulation is the estimated values
for w, which are shown in ﬁgure 15 re-expressed in terms of w= High values of w indicate a small degree of
credibility of the reﬂationary regime and suggest that the public believes that the regime will be abandoned
with high probability in favor of the deﬂationary regime. Note when w =1the reﬂationary regime is
identical to the deﬂationary regime and the estimated path for w =1implies this to be the case prior to
FDR’s inauguration. The ﬁgure shows that w declined substantially in 1933 with FDR’s inauguration and
— while showing some variation — it gradually declines until in 1937 when there is a clear shift in beliefs
towards a deﬂationary regime, consistent with our maintained hypothesis. That trend is only reversed
in the early months of 1938. These broad patterns of beliefs, estimated by the minimization of (44), are
consistent with the narrative accounts we reviewed in section 2. As the ﬁgures reveal there appears to be
slight lag, of one or two months, between our narrative account of the relevant policy communication and
t h ec h a n g ei nt h ep a t hf o rw= The policy announcement thus predict changes in w= The most likely reason
for this lag is that our model is completely forward looking so that any eect of policy has an immediate
eect on output and prices. Realistically, however, ﬁrms and consumers makes some decisions in advance,
of at least one or two months. Many authors (see e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)) introduce decision
lags of several quarters to account for some delay in monetary policy on output and prices. The estimated
path for w, when considered in light of the timing of policy communications, indicate that relatively small
decision lags (of less that one quarter) would be needed to explain a delayed eect of policy surprises on
output and prices during the Great Depression.
7 What was the reason for the mistake of 1937?
In the model the mistake of 1937 is treated as an exogenous shifts in beliefs, captured by the parameter
w> which we interpret as a change in the communication about future policy by policymakers, a conjecture
30supported by the narrative accounts from newspapers of this period. Left open, however, is why policy
makers choose to send the signals which had this dramatic eects on beliefs and shifted w. Broadly
speaking, one can hypothesize that either the mistake was (1) an unintentional communication of confusing
signals or (2) a deliberate (but mistaken) change in policy. Both possibilities can be supported by some
evidence, and we discuss each in turn. While this should be a subject of further study, we believe that in
the ﬁnal analysis, the most likely explanation is some combination of the two.
The ﬁrst explanation, that the policy communication was more unintentional than a deliberate change
of course, is more convincing if applied only President Roosevelt than to Federal Reserve policy makers.
In the early months of 1937 FDR was engaged in one of the toughest ﬁghts of his career—the "court-
packing ﬁasco." It was one of the few political battles he would lose during his presidency. FDR was
deeply frustrated with the Supreme Court, because it had been a major obstacle to his reforms, striking
down several New Deal programs as unconstitutional. In response FDR tried to stack the court in 1937 by
proposing legislation that mandated several of the justices to retire due to age. This caused a great furor,
both publicly and within Congress, and had a substantial negative impact on FDR’s credibility. In the
midst of this battle, which started in February 1937, FDR would have had di!culty paying close attention
to monetary policy. Indeed, FDR’s ohand remarks of inﬂationary dangers on April 2nd, which led to a
large market reaction and that some newspapers would later blame for the depression of 1937-38,19 appear
to have been made without much thought or discussion within the administration. Indeed, in 1938, FDR
tried to claim that he had wanted to inﬂate the price level to pre-depression levels all along, as he had
promised in 1933, despite his explicit warning against too much inﬂation in April of 1937 . Hence, it is
possible to argue that whatever comments FDR made about inﬂationary pressures in the spring 1937, they
were an example of confusing signals rather than a genuine change in his thoughts about policy.
What is more certain is that in February 1938 FDR put all his weight and credibility behind a renewed
commitment to reﬂate. In contrast to his warnings against excessive inﬂation this commitment seemed
to have been well thought out and deliberated within the administration. His formal announcement in a
press conference on February 19th was in fact prepared by the joint eorts of the Chairman of the Federal
Reserve and the Secretary of the Treasury, along with several senior advisors.
While one may argue that FDR may have been less than deliberate about the change in course of
policy in the spring of 1937, there appears to be less reason to doubt that the Federal Reserve abruptly
and deliberately changed course during that period (as we document in section 5) The question is why?
The most likely reason is that the Federal Reserve misread the economic situation and focused on a rather
narrow objective for social welfare in a "discretionary way" (in the sense of Kydland and Prescott (1977)).
Furthermore, with the passage of the Banking Act of 1935, the Federal Reserve may have seen itself as
no longer bound by FDR’s commitment to inﬂate the price level to pre-depression levels. To see why
an excessive tightening may have been rational for the Federal Reserve let us suppose that the Federal
Reserve was maximizing social welfare. Under certain conditions (see e.g. Eggertsson (2006a)), the social
welfare function can be approximated by a second order Taylor expansion of the utility of the representative
household yielding
Hw
4 X
W=w

Ww{2
W + \ 2
W}
19"Fall Elections Seen as Motive in Gold Action," Chicago Daily Tribune, Feb 16, 1938.
31Consider now the optimal solution from time w onwards under the assumption that the central bank
believes that the natural rate of interest uq
w is positive. In this case the Federal Reserve could minimize the
output and inﬂation at their social optimum, i.e. at w = \w =0by setting lw = uq
w A 0= Thus by reneging
on FDR’s 1933 commitment to reﬂate the price level to pre-depression levels the Federal Reserve could get
a better economic outcome. While this outcome is ex post optimal, it is not optimal ex ante because it
was optimal for the government in 1933 to create expectation about reﬂation. This ex post incentive to
renege on a previous inﬂation promise is what Eggertsson (2006a) coins the deﬂation bias of discretionary
policy. The snag in 1937, of course, is that there is every indication that the Federal Reserve misjudged
the natural rate of interest, believing that the depression was over and that the battle with deﬂation had
been won. This was a serious misjudgment. Thus, according to this interpretation, the mistake of 1937, as
far as the Federal Reserve was concerned, was a bad miscalculation of economic conditions.
8C o n c l u s i o n
A key question is whether or not Japan has been subject to contractionary spirals of the kind described
in this paper in recent years. To make this assessment, and then compare the result to those during
the Great Depression in the US, it is helpful to observe that an economy subject to the forces described
here does not need to experience excessive deﬂation of the order observed during the Great Depression
in the US. In a model that has a higher degree of price rigidities the contractionary spiral will mostly be
reﬂected in output instead of prices. In the very extreme when prices are perfectly rigid, for example, the
contractionary spiral will only show up in an output contraction without any change in prices. The key
condition for a contractionary spiral is a series of shocks so that the natural rate of interest is temporarily
negative because these kind of shocks cannot be fully accommodated due to the zero bound.
As always it is di!cult to draw strong comparisons between dierent countries at dierent times. Japan
today, certainly looks very dierent from the United States in 1937. Yet there are some similarities and
some lessons that Japanese policy makers may wish to keep in mind. The most obvious similarity is that
Japan is also contemplating a transition from zero interest rates to positive ones. The US experience
indicates that economic outcomes can be extremely sensitive to expectations given those circumstances. It
appears that Japan might be vulnerable to contractionary spirals. This highlights the importance of clear
communication by the BoJ about its future inﬂationary goals as argued by Eggertsson and Ostry (2005).
In particular, the market is very sensitive to signals about the future policy regime. Given the asymmetries
documented in the paper it seems to us more prudent to err on the side of inﬂation, rather than deﬂation.
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